yield relatively high rates of inflation. 1 Put another way, price stability and full employment are incompatible goals in the sense that conventional macroeconomic policy has not been able to achieve both simultaneously. Since political authorities can (and do) influence the rate of unemployment and inflation by manipulation of monetary and fiscal policy instruments, macroeconomic policy has been the focus of intense controversy and conflict between key political actors and interest groups.
This article examines postwar patterns in macroeconomic policies and outcomes associated with left-and right-wing governments in capitalist democracies. The main body of the article has three parts. The first section briefly reviews evidence, which is documented in great detail elsewhere,2 indicating that different unemployment/inflation outcomes have important, class-linked effects on the distribution of national income. It is argued that the economic interests at stake in various macroeconomic configurations are (implicitly) reflected in public opinion data on the relative aversion of different income and occupational groups to unemployment and inflation. The second part of the article presents a general scheme rank-ordering the preferences of political parties, arrayed along the traditional left to right spectrum, toward various economic goals, and analyzes highly aggregated data on unemployment and inflation outcomes in relation to the political orientation of regimes in 12 West European and North American nations. These international comparisons suggest that the "revealed preference" of leftist governments has been for relatively low unemployment at the expense of high rates of inflation, whereas, comparatively low inflation and high unemployment characterize political systems dominated by center and right-wing parties. The third and longest section of the article presents time-series analyses of quarterly postwar data on unemployment in the United States and Great Britain. The estimation results from the time-series models support the conclusion that unemployment has been driven downward during the tenure of Democratic and Labour administrations and has moved upward during periods of Republican and Conservative rule in the United States and Great Britain, respectively. The general conclusion of the study is that the macroeconomic policies pursued by leftand right-wing governments are broadly in accordance with the objective economic interests and subjective preferences of their classdefined core political constituencies.
Unemployment and Inflation: Objective Economic Interests and Subjective Preferences
A common rationalization for deflationary macroeconomic policies is that inflation adversely affects the economic position of wage and salary earners and, in particular, erodes the economic well-being of the poor. Empirical studies, however, give little support to this argument. The work of Blinder and Esaki, Hollister and Palmer, Metcalf, Thurow, Schultz, and others strongly indicates that a relatively low unemployment-high inflation macroeconomic configuration is associated with substantial relative and absolute improvements in the economic well-bring of the poor and, more generally, exerts powerful equalizing effects on the distribution of personal income.
Although these studies suggest that inflationary periods with tight labor markets are associated with a general equalization of the income distribution-the poor and certain middle income groups gaining at the expense of the rich-it nevertheless has been argued that the economic position of a substantial fraction of the labor force suffers a net decline during periods of vigorous economic expansion. The usual observation is that price rises tend to outstrip money wage increases during cyclical upswings and real wage rates therefore fall. Moreover, business expansions bring a general inflation of profits which yields increases in the halves of business upswings, during which unemployment typically falls and the rate of inflation rises, are associated with a pronounced squeeze on profits and are more accurately described as periods of wage-lead and profitdeflation. Although it is difficult to say whether these patterns in the cyclical behavior of wages and profits would persist in prolonged expansions, the evidence does demonstrate that the economic position of wage and salary earners as a group improves substantially, both in relative and absolute terms, during periods of relatively low unemployment and high rates of inflation.
If sustained economic expansions confer such obvious benefits on wage and salary earners generally and on low and middle income groups in particular, why have macroeconomic policy makers exhibited such keen sensitivity to the inflationary consequences of full employment? One explanation of why political authorities have been willing to accept less than full employment is that the mass of wage and salary earners have an "irrational" aversion to inflation, perhaps because people tend to view rising prices as an arbitrary "tax."8 Deflationary macroeconomic policies may therefore represent the political response to widespread anti-inflation sentiment in the mass public. Equation (1) simply expresses the proposition that-net of trends, cycles, and stochastic fluctuation in the unemployment time-series, which are captured by the autoregressive-moving average terms in the model23-we anticipate a gradual rise in unemployment levels under Conservative and Republican governments and, conversely, a gradual decline in unemployment levels during Labour and Democratic administrations. If a partisan change in government, occurring, for example, at time n, was sustained indefinitely (e.g., Gt = +1 for all t > n), the unemployment rate would eventually fluctuate about the steady state or equilibrium value j3/1-6. The rate of adjustment to the new equilibrium depends on the magnitude of the dynamic parameter 6. Since we assume that the macroeconomic policies of a new government are not introduced or implemented instantaneously, the intervention term Gt is specified with a one period (quarter) delay or lag.24
The British Unemployment Model. The first step in the model building process is to develop a preliminary specification of the stochastic or ARMA component of equation (1) ployment observations track the actual data quite well, which of course is expected in view of the highly significant parameter estimates and small residual variance reported in Table 2 . Diagnostic checks applied to the residuals provide more convincing evidence of the model's adequacy. Figure 7 presents the residual autocorrelations rk(dd) for lags 1 through 25. The autocorrelations exhibit no systematic patterns and, except for k = 4, fall within the approximate ?2 standard deviation limits.32 The mean of the residuals is i = .0000003 and the estimated standard error a 2 = .023. The sample evidence strongly suggests therefore that the at are independently distributed random variates with zero means. Returning to the parameter estimates in Table 2 
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In view of -the fact that the dynamic response parameter 62 = .407, the steady state effect of 32The lag 4 autocorrelation is of course significant and therefore the model might be improved by specifying at = (1-GaL4) Vt where the vt are N(Or2). Since the k=4 autocorrelation was essentially induced by the seasonal differencing (which overcompensates for the four-quarter seasonal dependency), and we are primarily interested in predicting the level unemployment series, modification of the model in this way is not advantageous. Table 3. 36The t ratio of P2 = 1.23 and of 82 1.60;both are insignificant at the .05 level. Computation of the implied dynamic response of the unemployment rate to American involvement in the Korean and Vietnamese civil wars is therefore problematic. Robert Solow has suggested to me that since the effects of both the war term and the administration term work through the actual tax, expenditure, and monetary actions of the government the model might be better specified by constraining al = 62. However, estimates obtained by imposing this constraint did not alter the results reported in Table 3 Having established the overall adequacy of the model, we focus on the substantive implications of the administration parametersB3 and i The estimates reported in Table 3 United States has held the presidency for more than two terms in succession during the postwar period, and therefore it is sensible to restrict the interpretation of the estimation results to 32 quarters or 8 years. 
